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Abstract
Under the assumption of rational person, the provision of 
altruistic behavior will eventually be exhausted. However, 
in reality, some people still would rather sacrifice their 
own interests to help others. This paper introduces 
altruistic social preference into utility function, researches 
on how to push the upgrade of altruistic behavior in the 
society through designing the incentive mechanism while 
realizing the maximum of individual interest and social 
welfare. This paper divides the individuals into individuals 
with high, middle and low altruistic levels and analyzes 
the effects of different incentive mechanisms on these 
three kinds of individuals. Finally, this paper comes to the 
comparative analysis on the policy effects by combining 
the effects of the proportion of the individuals with 
different altruistic levels in the group on the aggregate 
provision of altruistic behavior.
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INTRODUCTION
With the development of experimental economics and 
behavior game theory, the economists have found in 
their researches that the traditional self-interested person 
assumption cannot explain quite a few behaviors of human 
beings; such behaviors have a large extent of altruistic 
tendency and such altruism cannot be explained by means 
of kin theory and reciprocity theory, for example, in the 
cooperation with others in the group, one would punish 
the person violating the cooperation rules at his own costs 
even such violation is not targeted towards himself and 
even he anticipates that such costs for punishing others 
cannot be compensated (Henrich et al., 2001). Such 
behavior is called as “altruistic punishment” (Fehr & 
Gächter, 2002). 
Likewise, according to the assumption of rational 
person, the classical Nash equilibrium for the voluntary 
provision of public goods comes when all the participants 
choose to take a free ride. While the experimental results 
show that only a few subjects meet this deduction. In the 
experiment of public goods, in the early rounds of games, 
the subjects donate 40% to 60% assets averagely, while 
with the progress of games, the donation level decreases. 
This also proves the existence of altruistic behavior. This 
paper also tries to answer the question that how to inspire 
the altruistic behavior provision through the incentive 
mechanism (reward and punishment) design while 
considering not to crowd out the individual’s intrinsic 
motivation of social altruism (social preference).
This paper is structured as follows: Section 1 describes 
the literature review on this issue; section 2 models and 
analyzes the incentive mechanisms with social preference 
introduced and with social preference unintroduced, 
divides the individuals into 3 categories as per their 
different altruistic levels based on the individual’s utility 
function and surveys the equilibrium solution for the 
decision of individual’s altruistic behavior by introducing 
the factor of the effect of the social group’s altruistic 
level on the cost of individual’s implementing altruistic 
behavior; section 3 describes the comparative analysis on 
the effects of different incentive mechanisms.
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1.  LITERATURE REVIEW
As to many altruistic behaviors in reality, the researchers 
study the occurrence mechanism of altruistic behavior 
through a series of behavioral economics experiments and 
theoretical models, mainly including intrinsic decision 
maker’s behavior motivation—namely, social preference 
theory and extrinsic incentive mechanism design. The 
relationship between them on the effects of altruistic 
behavior is the disputes’ focus. 
In the early, Titmus (1971) and Hirschman (1985) 
thought that the extrinsic incentive had crowding out 
effect on social preference, thus reducing the impacts 
of explicit incentives correspondingly. Therefore, it was 
suggested that the smart social policymakers reduce 
the incentive means as the incentive effects reduce the 
crowding out effects would make the policymakers create 
large incentive for a certain goal. 
Lin and Yang (2006) made deep research based on the 
Gneezy and Rustichini (2000) model. Before a penalty 
was introduced, the parents would take the teachers’ 
behavior as a nonmarket behavior and avoid using it; 
while after a penalty was introduced, the parents would 
think that they get the convenience from their purchased 
service which made the lateness behavior increase; later, 
even the penalty was removed, the number of the parents 
coming late showed an increasing tendency as they 
thought such service was free. Therefore, they proposed 
that either severe penalty or no penalty be made. 
Different from the discussion on the above substitution 
relationship, Gneezy and Rustichini (2000) pointed 
out that the effects of monetary incentive on human’s 
behaviors was not one fold that cannot be simply 
discussed as complementary relationship or substitution 
relationship. The authors discussed the effects of monetary 
incentive on human’s behaviors through experiments 
and the results showed that most people had positive 
response towards the monetary incentives, namely, 
increasing the output; however, it was not true that people 
would increase the outputs with the monetary incentives 
provided at any time, some would provide more outputs 
when without the monetary incentives provided than that 
with the monetary incentives provided. 
Samuel Bowles and Sung-Ha Hwangadopted the 
indivisibility assumption different from the classical 
divisibility assumption, namely, the effects of morality 
and material interests on the human’s behavior cannot 
be simply divided, they discussed the relationship 
between the social preference and extrinsic incentives, 
thinking that such indivisibility caused the alternative or 
complementary relationship between the incentives and 
social preferences that explicit incentives would crowd in 
or crowd out social preferences, i.e., incentives sometimes 
may cause human’s behaviors towards the direction that 
the incentives expect to reach or sometimes may cause 
adverse effects (Bowles & Hwang, 2008). Therefore, 
the traditional intervention based on the incentive may 
not only be ineffective, but also the public policy may 
worsen the potential market failure and cause ineffective 
distribution equilibrium. The law designed for the rogue 
may cause rogue. 
Further, Bowles made a systematic research on how the 
social preferences affected the public economy, showing 
that altruism, reciprocity, intrinsic incentive, support for 
moral rules and other social preferences were essential to 
a sound government, under which, more desirable social 
distribution can be promoted as proper social distribution 
cannot be reached only through calling on people not to 
be selfish and the extrinsic incentives were also necessary 
(Bowles & Hwang, 2014). 
Hence, Siciliani (2009) considered introducing 
the providers’ heterogeneous altruistic levels as to the 
provision of public goods (taking medical treatment as 
an example), studied the number of medical treatment 
provided by the medical service providers with different 
altruistic levels after the change on the medical services’ 
prices. The research showed that the increase of price may 
have no effect on the aggregate output, when stigma effect 
was adequately highly correlated with higher prices, it may 
cause the decrease of aggregate output. The providers with 
high and low altruistic levels may have positive response 
towards such incentive system while the providers with 
middle altruistic level may make no response towards it. 
Bowles further discussed the crowding out effect of 
extrinsic incentive on social preference, thinking that 
the incentive mechanisms like penalty and subsidy were 
not the root reasons for crowding out effect (Bowles & 
Reyes, 2012). Seemingly, the crowding out effect caused 
by the incentive mechanisms like penalty and subsidy 
was to seek more incentives, which was determined by 
the existing systems and the relationship between people. 
The experiment showed that the incentive effect may be 
larger when the incentive mechanism was chosen by the 
individual independently than that when it was regulated 
by the government. In case the government intended 
to guide the social preferences by means of penalty, 
the effects may be smaller and even adverse. Finally 
the experiment proved that as to the same incentive 
mechanism, the provision by the individual may develop 
prosocial behavior easier than the provision by the 
government and the incentive mechanism would cause 
crowding in effect instead of crowding out effect, thus 
it was concluded that incentive mechanism and social 
preference were complementary goods instead of the 
substitute goods. 
The individual’s behavior is not completely determined 
by measurable monetary value like money and material, 
but also commonly influenced by morality and preference; 
especially the altruistic behavior is more influenced by 
social preference. However, the individual heterogeneity 
causes that the same extrinsic incentive may have different 
effects on different people; therefore, it’s not rigorous to 
make dual complementary or substitute discussion of the 
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effects of extrinsic incentive and social preference for the 
altruistic behavior.
2.  ALTRUISTIC BEHAVIOR INCENTIVE 
MECHANISM WITH SOCIAL PREFERENCE
Social preferences are, under the premise of keeping 
rationality assumption, a type of human being’s 
behavioral mode considering the social emotions such 
as fairness and reciprocity in sociology and psychology 
that’s distinguished from altruistic assumption, including 
altruistic preference, reciprocal preference and equal 
preference. Altruistic preference refers to the individual 
sacrificing his interests to increase others’ utility. This 
paper assumes that the individual will get benefits from 
providing altruistic behavior, but meanwhile he will 
undertake cost due to the implementation of altruistic 
behavior and will respond to the incentive mechanism. 
Based on the research of Siciliani (2009), individual 
utility function is set with representing total utility and the 
total utility is determined by the individual’s benefits from 
his providing altruistic behavior and his costs, meanwhile, 
individual heterogeneity is introduced, taking θ as the 
factor of measuring individual’s altruistic level, θ∈[0,1]. 
When θ=0, it means the individual is a perfect egoist and 
when θ=1, the individual is a perfect altruist. 
θ, on one hand, represents the individual’s altruistic 
level and on the other hand, it can be used to illustrate 
to which extent the individual considers other’s benefits 
for his own benefits. Whether the individual helps others 
out of sympathy or other reasons, we think that: the more 
willing to help others, the more consideration of other’s 
benefits. Suppose a beneficiary of altruistic behavior gets 
benefit d(q) from the altruistic behavior, and the marginal 
benefit that the beneficiary gets from altruistic behavior 
is positive and decreasing, then we can get d′(q)>0 and 
d″(q)<0. In the individual’s utility function, θ*d(q) 
represents the benefits that the beneficiary gets.
The cost function of the individual’s altruistic behavior 
is represented byc(q), where q refers to the quantity of 
altruistic behavior provided, the unit cost c is related 
with the proportion of individuals with different altruistic 
levels in the group. Set the proportion of individuals with 
high altruistic level in the group being m and n for that of 
middle altruistic level, then the proportion of individuals 
with low altruistic level is 1-m-n, and among which, the 
proportion of the individuals with middle altruistic level 
is relatively larger. Suppose that the individuals with 
middle altruistic level have no impact on the unit cost c 
of altruistic behavior, the unit cost c varies only with the 
change of the proportion of the individuals with high and 
low altruistic levels, and the unit cost decreases when 
the individuals with high altruistic level are more than 
those with low altruistic level, and otherwise the unit cost 
increases, then we can get 
  c q（ , ）,                                  (1)
and
，  . 
It’s further assumed that the individual not only cares 
about the beneficiary but also cares whether he has a good 
reputation or not. If the individual’s provision of altruistic 
behavior q ≥ q~ (among which, q~ is a normal number 
greater than 0), he would be regarded as a noble man and 
thus win good reputation, otherwise, the individual at 
(q < q~) cannot get good reputation but also will not get 
bad reputation. We assume that all the individuals like 
good reputation, r(q) represents the benefit from good 
reputation and the good reputation is correlated with the 
quantity of his altruistic behavior provision, i.e.∂r(q) ⁄ 
∂θ=0 . In summary, we can give the individual’s utility 
function an explicit form:
    . (2) 
Setting y to a constant and supposing y=y0, solve the 
first derivative of q over θ, we have: .
As d(q)>0, the direction of ∂q/∂θ depends on *
-θ*d′(q).
When *c>θ*d′(q), namely, θ< *c/d′(q), 
we get ∂q/∂θ>0, which means that the provision of the 
individual’s altruistic behavior increases with the increase 
of his altruistic level.
When c<θ*d′(q), namely, θ> *c/d′(q), 
we get ∂q/∂θ<0, which means that the provision of the 
individual’s altruistic behavior decreases with the increase 
of his altruistic level.
This is different from our common sense, usually 
we think that the provision of the individual’s altruistic 
behavior increases with the increase of his altruistic level, 
but here our research shows that:
When c- *θ*d′(q) or when the individual’s 
altruistic level , the quantity of provision 
of the altruistic behavior with the maximized utility 
reaches maxima rather than as we usually think that the 
provision of his altruistic behavior comes to the maximum 
when the individual is a perfect altruist(θ=1). 
When ≥1, ∂q/∂θ>0 and when θ=1, q takes 
the maxima, i.e., under such circumstance, when the 
individual’s utility is maximized, the quantity of the 
altruist behavior provided by the perfect altruist reaches 
the most.
The properties of the individual’s benefit function are 
shown in Figure 1.
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Figure 1
The Properties of the Individual’s Benefit function
When a specific value is taken for , we take 
4 individuals with different altruistic levels, setting 
0<θ1<θ2<θ3<θ4<1.
As c= *θ*d′(q), i.e.d′(q)= *c/θ, it’s known 
that q is the function of c/θ. As θ1<θ2<θ3<θ4we can get 
*c/θ1> *c/θ2> *c/θ3> *c/θ4. And it 
can be known from the d′(q)’s monotonically decreasing 
properties that
 
When q>q~, the individual can get the benefit r(q) 
from his good reputation and hence leap occurs at q>q ~ in 
individual’s benefit function. 
As seen from the figure, an individual with low 
altruistic level (such as θ1) obtains the maximum utility 
when , which means that good reputation is not important 
for him as the benefits from good reputation cannot make 
up for the costs of increasing the provision of altruistic 
behavior and at that time, his provision of altruistic 
behavior doesn’t change with the existence of good 
reputation.
An individual with high altruistic level (such as θ4) 
obtains the maximum utility when q>q~. Also we can 
observe that the maximum utility is still obtained at the 
same q even without the utility from good reputation, 
which means that good repuation simply increases the 
benefits of the individual with high altruistic level and 
will not change the provision of his altruistic behavior.
An individual with middle altruistic level (such θ2 as 
θ3 and) obatins the maximum utility when q<q
~ if without 
considering the benefits from good reputation, and 
 
But after introducing the benefit r(q) from good 
reputation, the costs due to increasing the provision 
of altruistic behavior are offset, at this moment, the 
individuals with altruistic levels θ2 and θ3 tend to provide 
q altruistic behavior to maximize their own utilities. The 
individuals with the altruistic levles within this range 
choose to provide altruistic behavior with the same 
quantity q for their own utilties’ maximization. 
Finally we conclude that the introduction of the benefit 
from good reputation has no impact on the individuals with 
low and high altruistic levels to make decision on providing 
the altruistic behavior, but the individuals with middle 
altruistic level may increase providing altruistic behavior.
3 .   I N F L U E N C E  M E C H A N I S M  O F 
ECONOMIC INCENTIVES ON ALTRUISTIC 
B E H AV I O R  W H E N  W I T H  S O C I A L 
PREFERENCES UNINTRODUCED
The biggest difference of altruistic behavior from the 
goods traded in the market is that altruistic behavior 
has no price, which means that no equivalent exchange 
occurs with the occurrence of altruistic behavior and thus 
the altruistic behavior cannot be measured by the market 
method. The output of altruistic behavior caused by the 
pure cost of giving is influenced by the individual’s moral 
level. Suppose we provide reward for the individual 
providing altruistic behavior, setting the reward as s. 
Without considering the positive effects of altruistic 
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behavior on the individuals, the individual’s utility 
function is given by
 , (3)
but the r(q) function’s form may vary at this moment. 
When without the extrinsic incentives, suppose r(q) is 
only correlated with the individual’s good reputation and 
the good reputation is only correlated with the quantity 
of provision of the individual’s altruistic behavior. But 
after the reward mechanism is introduced, the altruist’s 
behavior motivation is questioned, thinking that his 
motivation of providing altruistic behavior is to get the 
reward and such questioning has negative impact on his 
reputation. We suppose the negative impact takes the 
following form: 
    rs(q)=-β*s*q. (4)
β is a positive parameter and 0<β<1, indicating to 
which extent the reward influences the invididual’s 
repuation. The bigger β, the bigger negative impact of 
reward on the individual’s reputation, and vice verse. 
Then, the individual’s utility function changes into .            (5)
Suppose the reputation and its extra utility r(q)-
β*s*q=0, then q satisfies the following condition:
  . (6)
We differentiate q over θ and get 
,
namely, .
As known from the above assumptions, d(q)>0, 
hence we only need to judge the relationship between the 
denominator and 0,θ*d′ (q)>0 , then:
(1) if *c<s, i.e., the reward can make up for the 
cost of altruistic behavior, ∂q/∂θ<0, then the provision 
of altruistic behavior decreases with the increase of the 
altruistic level.
(2) if *c>s, two circumstances can be discussed:
① when *c>s+θ*d′(q), i.e., θ< , then 
∂q/∂θ>0, the provision of altruistic behavior increases 
with the increase of the individual’s altruistic level.
② when *c<s+θ*d′(q), i.e., θ> , then 
∂q/∂θ<0, the provision of altruistic behavior decreases 
with the increase of the individual’s altruistic level.
If without the incentive mechanism, the conclusion 
is similar that the provision of altruistic behavior 
doesn’t monotonically increase with the increase of the 
individual’s altruistic level, instead
When the  individual ’s  a l t ru is t ic  level  takes 
θ= ∈[0,1], the individual provides the most 
quantity of altruistic behavior. 
When  >1, q gets the maximum at θ=1. 
Without considering the individual being a perfect 
altruist and in the model with incentive mechanism 
unintroduced, when θ= , the individual provides 
the most quantity of altruistic behavior, and after the 
reward mechanism is introduced, q gets the maximum at 
θ= .
As *c> *c-s, and d′(q) monotonically 
decreases, for the individual with the same altruistic level, 
then we can get 
 
In summary, without considering the social preferences, 
the individual provides more altruistic behavior with the 
extrinsic reward mechanism introduced than that with the 
extrinsic reward mechanism unintroduced.
Further, we loosen the assumption of the reputation 
and its affiliated utility being 0, suppose that reputation 
is important to the individual, i.e., r(q)-β*s*q>0, then q’s 
condition is:  . 
(7)
Solve the first derivative of q over θ ,  getting 
.
If *c-s*(1-β)<0, namely, the reward and the 
integrated utility of negative effect of the reward on the 
altruist’s reputation are larger than the costs of altruistic 
behavior, then ∂q/∂θ<0, and the provision of altruistic 
behavior decreases with the increase of the individual’s 
altruistic level. 
W h e n  * c > ( 1 - β ) * s + θ * d ′ ( q ) ,  n a m e l y, 
, then ∂q/∂θ>0 and q monotonically 
increases over θ;
W h e n * c < ( 1 - β ) * s + θ * d ′ ( q ) ,  n a m e l y , 
, then ∂q/∂θ<0, q monotonically 
decreases over θ;
At this time, q gets the maximum at θ=
=θk∈[0,1].
If  >1, then q gets the maximum at θ=1.
Likewise, without considering that q gets the 
maximum at θ=1, we get θi>θk >θj. Suppose the negative 
effect of reputation and reward on the individual is not 
0, the maximum of the provision of altruistic behavior 
is acquired at  higher than that with the reputation and 
its affiliated utility being 0, and θk - θj=s*β/d′(q), which 
Copyright © Canadian Academy of Oriental and Occidental Culture
Incentive Mechanisms of Altruistic Behavior With Social 
Preference Introduced and the Effects Comparison
156
means that the increased altruistic level is used to make 
up for the decrease in the reputation caused by the reward 
corresponding to the marginal benefit of the benefiniary.
As , we get 
. 
Namely, when the individuals’ altruistic levels are the 
same, consider the circumstance that the q’s maxima at 
the reputation and its affiliated utility being is smaller than 
that at the reputation and its affiliated utility being 0 but 
larger than that without incentive mechanism. 
4.  COMPARISON OF POLICY EFFECTS
Under the condition of without incentive mechanism, 
the individual tends to provide more altruistic behavior 
with the increase of his altruistic level, however, due to 
the benefit from the reputation, within certain scope, the 
individuals with middle altruistic level choose to provide 
the altruistic behavior at the point of .
With the introduction of incentive mechanism, the 
individual’s behavior’s motivation changes. When a low 
reward is provided for the individual’s altruistic behavior, 
the total social provision of altruistic behavior tends to 
increase, wherein, the individuals with low altruistic level 
increase the provision, part of the individuals with middle 
altruistic level may not respond to the reward mechanism, 
while the low reward causes an increase in the provision 
of altruistic behavior by the individuals with high altruistic 
level; however, when the reward exceeds a certain value, 
crowding out effect may be caused to the individuals 
with high altruistic level thus the altruistic behavior may 
be reduced, when the increase in the provision of the 
altruistic behavior by the individuals with low altruistic 
levels that’s caused by the reward is not enough to make 
up for the decreased provision of altruistic behavior due 
to the crowding out effect, then the incentive mechanism 
is not desirable. Later, the proof of the provision of the 
altruistic behavior being correlated with the proportion 
of the individuals with different altruistic levels is also 
verified, when the proportion of the individuals with 
low altruistic level is comparatively more, the high-
level reward is desirable; on the contrary, when more 
individuals with high altruistic level are in the group, low-
level reward shall be provided correspondingly. 
When the behavior of not giving help with others’ peril 
is punished, even the cost that the government pays for 
the implementation of the punishment for not giving help 
with others’ peril is not considered, there also exist an 
optimal supervision cost and a penalty for breaking law. 
When the punishment is too severe, it not only increases 
the government’s expenditures but also causes reaction 
to the individual’s provision of altruistic behavior. Under 
the proper punishment system, the individuals with low 
altruistic level will provide more altruistic behavior.
Compare the effects of reward mechanism and penalty 
mechanism on the individual and we can find that when 
the levels of reward and penalty are light, positive effects 
on the social aggregate provision of altruistic behavior 
are caused, when the reward and penalty are excessive, 
negative effects may be caused and the individuals with 
high altruistic level are affected most. When the expected 
law-breaking cost  for the punitive measure is larger 
than the reward’s aggregate utility , the crowding out 
effects of the punitive measure shall be smaller, and as 
the reward’s aggregate utility is affected by the negative 
reputation caused by the reward on the individual, namely, 
the reward’s utility against the penalty’s effect may be 
discounted, thus, in summary, the punitive measure pushes 
the increased effective scope of the provision of altruistic 
behavior to become larger.
We summarize the changes of the individual’s behavior 
after the introduction of incentive mechanism as shown in 
Table 1.
Table 1
Comparison on the Various Policy Effects
Contents Individuals with low altruistic level
Individuals with 
middle altruistic 
level
Individuals with 
high altruistic 
level
Social aggregate
The individual’s 
behavior with 
incentive 
mechanism 
unintroduced
Not 
consider 
the 
reputatin 
effect
The provision of the individual’s altruistic behavior 
increases with the increase of the altruistic level.
When the proportion of the individuals with 
high altruistic level in the group is larger, not 
only the provision of the individual’s altruistic 
behavior will increase but also the social 
aggregate provision of altruistic behavior will 
increase.
Consider 
the 
reputatin 
effect
The provision of 
altruistic behavior 
increases
May provide 
altruistic behavior 
with quantity of 
The provision 
of altruistic 
behavior 
decreases
Contents Individuals with low altruistic level
Individuals with 
middle altruistic 
level
Individuals with 
high altruistic 
level
Social aggregate
To be continued
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Contents Individuals with low altruistic level
Individuals with 
middle altruistic 
level
Individuals with 
high altruistic 
level
Social aggregate
The individual’s 
behavior with 
reward mechanism 
introduced
Not 
consider 
the 
reputatin 
effect
The provision of the individual’s altruistic behavior 
increases with the existence of reward.
The social aggregate provision of altruistic 
behavior increases when low-level reward is 
provided, and the effect of the reward on the 
provision of altruistic behavior is crowding 
in effect at this moment. When the reward 
exceeds a certain level, the provision of 
altruistic behavior decreases and the reward 
will bring about crowding out effect, and the 
higher the proportion of individuals with high 
altruistic level, the earlier the crowding out 
effect occurs.
Consider 
the 
reputation 
effect
The rovision of 
altruistic behavior 
increases
The quantity of 
altruistic behavior 
is unchanged and is 
still kept at 
The rovision 
of altruistic 
behavior 
decreases
The individual’s behavior with 
penalty mechanism introduced
The introduction of punitive measure may increase the 
provision of the individual’s altruistic behavior.
The provision of altruistic behavior increases 
when the punishment is lighter, and the 
provision of altruistic behavior decreases when 
the punishment is extremely severe; when 
>the punitive measure is superior to reward 
measure as the crowding out caused by the 
punitive measure is smaller than that caused 
by the reward measure.
Continued
CONCLUSION
We come to the following conclusions based on the 
paper’s research and the analysis of individual’s behavior 
under the conditions of without incentive mechanism and 
with reward or penalty mechanism adopted: 
a) Compared with the provision of the individual’s 
altruistic behavior when without incentive mechanism, 
the proper incentive mechanism will lead to the increase 
of the aggregate provision of altruistic behavior, among 
which, the individuals with high and low altruistic levels 
respond positively to the incentive mechanism and the 
individuals with middle altruistic level may not respond.
b) When there are too many rewards or the punishment 
is extremely severe, the aggregate provision of altruistic 
behavior may be decreased due to the crowding out effects 
and the crowding effects are affected by the group’s 
aggregate altruistic level that the crowding out effect shall 
be larger when more individuals with high altruistic level 
are in the group.
c) When the reward is the same as the expected 
expenditure of the punishment, the reward’s crowding 
out effect is larger and it is more desirable to adopt the 
punitive measure at this time. 
It means that the policymakers shall first evaluate the 
social aggregate altruistic level when considering what 
policies are adopted to increase the social aggregate 
provision of the altruistic behavior. Lighter reward or 
penalty is more appropriate when the aggregate altruistic 
level is higher and the reward or penalty shall be increased 
when the aggregate altruistic level is lower.
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